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ABSTRACT
Romanticized visions of Khalistan became emotively embedded in the hearts and
minds of Sikh-Canadians following the execution of Operation Blue Star. Today,
insurgents residing within the contested homeland continue to draw support from Sikh
immigrants and their Canadian-born descendants. Perplexingly, while a sizable
proportion of second and third-generation Sikh youth advocate for the creation of the
theocratic state of Khalistan, many selectively disregard the righteous way of life
envisioned by the founders of the Khalsa Panth. This paper presents a conceptual
sociological analysis of the diasporic politics of identity and homeland. Although
Marx, and other modern social theorists, had presumed that nationalism would
eventually disappear, globalization has attributed new importance to the project of
nation-building, and imagined political communities. Using the Sikh nationalist
liberation movement as the point of departure, this paper demonstrates that ethno-racial
markers of identity, and primordial religious mythologies, can be politically employed
to distract members of oppressed groups from realizing the material conditions which
perpetuate inequality in post-colonial capitalist states. Considering that ethnies are
never universally homogenous groups, and that economic incentives exist for seizing
state power, nationalist movements can only be understood by identifying the concrete
class interests of their principal exponents. While the Punjab problem represents the
empirical focus of this paper, the rich sociological insights on inter-communal conflict,
identity, and belonging are generalizable beyond this immediate context.
Keywords: Khalistan, Sikhism, Punjab, Canada, diaspora, immigration, nationalism,
identity, identity politics, primordialism, ethnicity, race, caste, social class, class
consciousness, false consciousness, ideology, hegemony, social control
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INTRODUCTON:
At the founding convention of the World Sikh Organization (WSO) in 1984,
Ajaib Singh Bagri vehemently declared:
The destiny of communities is changed when the blood of
martyrs is spilled… I give you my most solemn assurance,
until we kill 50,000 Hindus we will not rest… the Khalsa
have to clash iron with iron… if anybody tries to get our
nation annihilated, all of his family and children will be
reduced to pulp (Quoted in Duthel, 2014: 484; emphasis
added).
The intoxicating amalgamation of propaganda and scripture espoused by the
orthodox preacher aroused the long-dormant nationalist sentiments of the Sikh diaspora
(Bell, 2007: 23). Aspirations for the theocratic homeland of Khalistan (the land of the
pure) had initially emerged in Punjab (the land of five rivers) during the abdication of
British colonial rule. However, the struggle for Sikh self-determination was first formally
pursued within the legal confines of India’s political-economic system. Under the postcolonial state, the Sikhs’ campaign for independence proved to be ineffective due to
pervasive communal bias in the allocation of social, political, and economic resources
which emanated from the central government’s tacit adherence to Hindutva nationalist
ideology.
Within the ‘socialist’, ‘secular’, and ‘democratic’ Indian Republic, the historical
grievances of the Sikhs, and other marginalized ethno-religious groups, were
purposefully disregarded since they were inconsistent with the national politics of
dynastic succession, and the transnational priorities of the post-independence period.
While communal calls to arms resonated with Sikhs residing in the contested homeland,
they also appealed to members of the diaspora who were physically separated, but still
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emotionally tied to the region of Punjab. The latter group of Sikhs, who had ventured
beyond the land of five rivers, were forced to painfully sever their nationalist loyalties to
Bharat Mata (Mother India) when televised news coverage of the desecration of the
Harmandir Sahib complex was finally broadcasted. State-sanctioned religious persecution
facilitated the intensification of Khalistani ethno-nationalism in Punjab, while also
serving as the explosive catalyst for the deadliest terrorist attack recorded in Canadian
history.
The violent secessionist movement continues to draw moral, ideological, and
economic support from Sikh immigrants and their Canadian-born descendants. Today,
romanticized visions of the ‘land of the pure’ have become emotively embedded in the
hearts and minds of many second and third-generation diasporic youth. Perplexingly,
while newer generations of Canadian-Sikhs support the imagined theocratic state of
Khalistan, they selectively disregard the righteous way of life envisioned by the founders
of the Khalsa Panth (pure faith), and dismiss the spiritual guidance proffered in the Adi
Granth (Sikh holy book). This paper presents a conceptual analysis of the diasporic
politics of identity and homeland. Although the Punjab problem represents the empirical
focus of this paper, the rich sociological insights on inter-communal conflict, identity,
and belonging are generalizable beyond this immediate context.
Using the Sikh nationalist liberation movement as the point of departure, this
paper will demonstrate that ethno-racial markers of identity, and primordial religious
mythologies, can be politically employed to distract members of oppressed groups from
realizing the material conditions which perpetuate inequality in post-colonial societies.
Considering that ethnies are never universally homogenous groups, and that economic
incentives exist for seizing state power, nationalist movements can only be understood by
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identifying the concrete class interests of their principal exponents (Allahar, 2008: 1).
The homeland struggle of the imagined Sikh community is rooted in stark class, and
caste-based, power differentials which have been generated by the political-economic
contradictions of peripheral capitalist development.
In the contemporary period, the grievances of marginalized populations cannot be
resolved through regressive resegregation efforts, or secessionist movements. In the longterm, the pervasive and problematic politics of cultural difference is unconducive to
progressive social change, since the struggle for human emancipation is intrinsically tied
up with a growing need for social solidarity, and collective sense of forgetfulness. Global
social justice can only be achieved through the abolishment of private property, and the
implementation of the proletarian dictatorship. In light of the reductionist nature of
orthodox Marxist theory, especially its tendency to demote non-class-based inequalities
to the status of epiphenomena, a neo-Marxist analysis will be propounded in the ensuing
discussion.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section one outlines Marxian
class theory while attempting to integrate considerations of caste, race, and ethnicity into
the discourse of economic power. Section two examines the persistence of nationalism,
and assesses the challenges posed to proletarian internationalism by globalization.
Section three provides a synoptic pre and post-partition genealogy of the social and
economic origins of Khalistani ethno-nationalism. Section four considers the
contributions of diasporic Sikhs to the struggle for homeland, and addresses the politics
of remembering and forgetting. Finally, section five draws conclusions.
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SECTION I: MARXIAN CLASS THEORY
Class and Caste Stratification: A Conceptual Distinction
Before examining the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of the
Khalistani ethno-nationalist movement, and the material interests of its proponents, a
brief discussion pertaining to social class is in order. Wright (1980: 326) succinctly
defines classes as sets of “…common positions within the social relations of production”.
As opposed to signifying a social grouping of individuals, or an arbitrary ranking within a
hierarchal system of power relations, classes can be conceived of as connections which
arise when individuals engage in interdependent economic exchanges within society
(Morrison, 2006: 55).
The life course trajectory of the modern social actor is profoundly shaped by
class, since advantages, or disadvantages, are conferred on the basis of one’s relationship
to the productive sphere. Within modern class-stratified societies like Canada, vertical
social mobility is highly unlikely, but still theoretically possible. In contrast, within
traditional societies like India, where elements of caste hierarchization are latently
embedded into institutional structures and practices, movement between, and among,
strata is impossible due to the rigidness of the system of ascribed primordial social ranks
and statuses.
Caste-based status differentiation is not exclusive to the Indian subcontinent, but
the earliest expressions of this system are located within ancient Vedic scriptures (Bayly,
1999: 23). The Rig Veda and Bhagavad Gita are replete with references to purity and
pollution which signify that individuals of lower birth will remain constrained to the
inferior caste position they were ascribed at birth, even if they amass material wealth, or
attain occupational mobility (Hawley, 2011: 16). Though scheduled castes are protected
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by the Constitution of India, many Hindus still ‘choose’ to practice endogamy so
privilege, or disadvantage, tends to become structured intergenerationally.
Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith, allegedly set out to abolish the
oppressive Brahmanical Hindu caste system, gender inequality, and idol worship (Tatla,
1999: 16). Nanak, the first of the nine celestial Sikh Gurus, was born into a Hindu
Kshatriya family during a period of profound socio-political turmoil near present-day
Lahore (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 15). In Vedic scriptures, Kshatriyas represent the
second echelon out of the four major caste divisions into which adherents of the Hindu
faith are classified. The Kshatriyas were well respected in early medieval India since they
were ordained as the armed protectors of the Hindu Samaj (community). Nevertheless,
unlike the Brahmin priests which occupied the highest rank in the caste hierarchy, the
Kshatriya warriors were not necessarily wealthy (Jadhav, 2007: 1).
According to the mythological Sikh Janamsakhis (birth stories), Nanak devoted
his life to travelling across the Indian subcontinent “…to spread the ultimate truth and to
put mankind on the path to salvation” (Sarna, 2003: 72; emphasis added). In stark
contrast to the Brahmin priests who denied those of lower birth entry into Hindu mandirs
(temples), Nanak actively delivered sermons to permanently polluted populations
(Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998: 7). The Guru’s divine version of ‘truth’, which was
ideologically devoid of caste differentiation and inequality, appealed to Hindus of
untouchable birth, as well as members of other religious denominations who were
primordially relegated to inferior positions within the hierarchical structure of Indian
society (Puri, 2003: 1).
Whereas the devotees of the Sikh faith were primarily derived from the
downtrodden, illiterate, and backward castes, Nanak, and the other nine successive
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Gurus, originated from educated Kshatriya families (Jodhka, 2014: 586). Sikh scholars
tend to regard Nanak as a revolutionary however, the Guru’s condemnation of the Vedic
system of social stratification may also be interpreted as a form of political opportunism.
Under the prevailing structural arrangements of medieval India, the Gurus only
symbolically benefitted from their caste position. Thus, Nanak may have made a rational
decision to reject the binary oppositions of purity and pollution, which form the
ideological basis of Hindu caste stratification, in favour of forming a new hierarchy
which strategically placed him in a position of divine authority.
History evinces that inequitable power relations are often challenged by those that
do not benefit from social structural constraints. For most devout Sikhs, this contention
would likely be considered blasphemous since the Gurus are revered as great liberators of
the weak, needy, and disadvantaged. Still, irrespective of the political-economic factors
which may have contributed to Nanak denouncing the oppressive elements of the Hindu
faith, Sikhism also functions to entrench and legitimate unequal power differentials
between the privileged and underprivileged. While chastising and dismantling the caste
system of Hinduism, Nanak created favourable conditions for the construction of a
parallel primordial stratification system amongst Sikhs.
Puri (2003: 1) notes that over time, the Sikh faith has evolved and incorporated
elements of casteism that were similar, yet different to that of the Vedic hierarchical
system. In the caste ordering of the Sikhs, “…Jats who own cultivable land form the
upper echelon, artisans occupy the middle strata, while landless labourers reside at the
bottom” (Singh and Dhanda, 2014: 501). Thus, despite the absence of caste distinction in
scriptural ideology, the dominant Jat agriculturalists enjoy elevated status within the Sikh
community, and commonly exercise economic power in the political institutions of
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Indian society. Bal (2005: 3979) notes that high birth is not always a source of economic
power since Jats, and other Sikh caste-groups, are internally fragmented with regards to
property ownership, educational attainment, and socioeconomic position. Nevertheless,
since the advent of globalization and the capitalist modernization of India, the caste and
class interests of both the rural and urban Punjabi-Sikhs have slowly begun to
complement and overlap with one another.
The conceptual distinction between class and caste is important for the ensuing
discussion on Sikh secessionist politics and ethno-nationalism. While the foundational
basis of the caste system is primarily ideological, class position is determined by both
objective material conditions, which may change in exceedingly rare circumstances, and
a subjective awareness of one’s position within the terrain of social relations. Due to the
stringent social enforcement of caste-based hierarchies, and their religious and cultural
underpinnings, class-based systems of social stratification are comparatively less rigid.
The History of Class Struggle:
A number of theoretical paradigms have been developed to explain the
persistence of class-based inequalities in capitalist societies, but the Marxist sociological
framework continues to have the greatest explanatory and exhortatory strengths.
Paradoxically, however, while class-based analyses are central to the historical materialist
approach, Marx failed systematically to define class, and elaborate upon his usage of the
concept (Wright, 1985: 6). Nonetheless, the general consensus among Marxists is that the
essential determinant of an individual’s class position is ownership of the means of
production, or lack thereof (Sirianni, 1981: 281). Ownership, or non-ownership, has
implications for control, or exploitation, and the degree of autonomy members of a
particular class exercise within a given society (Swingewood, 1975: 114).
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In “The Communist Manifesto” (herein referred to as the “Manifesto”), Marx and
Engels (1848: 1) famously asserted that “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is
the history of class struggles". According to Marx, and his co-conspirator, successive
transitions between historical epochs have been premised upon conflict between a
weakening dominant class, and an emerging class vying for power (McLaverty, 2005:
47). The highly influential political manuscript elucidates that the current form of
capitalist socioeconomic organization is neither natural, nor immutable to structural
transformation, since class antagonisms between the oppressors and the oppressed have
resulted in radical changes within seemingly stable societies.
While delineating the unstable dynamics of power relations within the dominant
modes of production, Marx and Engels also established that class-based hierarchies have
become more simplified over time. The “Manifesto” expounds that the profound sociopolitical changes which accompanied the Enclosure Movements, and the Industrial
Revolution, resulted in the partition of society into two opposing camps: the bourgeoisie
and proletariat. Upon securing power from the aristocratic elites of the feudal era, and
gaining exclusive control over the productive forces, the bourgeoisie arose as the new
dominant class of the capitalist epoch. The agrarian peasantry was transmuted into the
industrial proletariat following the annexation of the commons, and the institution of
private property.
During the feudal era, mutual obligations and loyalties had provided the
foundational basis of social relations, as well as the system of land tenureship (Hilton,
1976: 13). Under capitalism, a market society emerged which released feudal subjects
from manorial bondage, while also permitting members of the landless working-class to
exchange labour power for wages which were paid out by the owners of the means of
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industrial production (Macpherson, 1965: 7). Today, wage labour is conventionally
understood to represent a mutually beneficial economic arrangement which employers
and employees enter into ‘voluntarily’. Nevertheless, the Marxist interpretation, which
goes beyond superficial analysis, reveals that the social relations of capitalist production
are not only imbued with asymmetric power differentials, but they are also inherently
exploitative.
Since subsistence farming was forcefully and violently suppressed at the dawn of
the Industrial Revolution, workers were required to offer their labour services to
employers in order to ensure an adequate standard of material well-being. Hick and
Allahar (2011: 10) astutely convey that modern workers are coerced into both formal, and
informal, market-based contracts under economic duress. The only alternative to wage
labour is slow starvation and eventual death, so the proletariat ‘accept’ unfair
compensation, as well as poor working conditions, “under the compulsion of the whip of
hunger” (Weber, 1927: 110). An immiserated class of workers, which owns nothing else
but its labour power, is indispensable for the optimal functioning of the economic system.
In late capitalist societies, the central industrialist imperatives of surplus value extraction,
and profit maximization, continue to be realized through the perpetual reproduction,
expansion, and intensification of the exploitative relations of production.
In the “Manifesto”, Marx and Engels envisioned alternative socialist visions for
human relations, and the social, political, and economic ordering of society. The radical
social theorists contended that the demise of capitalism, and by extension the bourgeoisie,
was dialectically tied to the masses developing a subjective awareness of their common
grievances against the dominant class, as well as the structural conditions which
perpetuate economic domination. The revolutionary impetus for social change was to be

10

provided by the internal contradictions of capital accumulation, which according to Marx
and Engels, would inevitably generate antagonisms between “the exploiting appropriators
and the exploited producers” (Quoted in Wood, 2015: 117).
Once workers realized that their class interests were antithetical to that of the
capitalist owners, they were expected to institute a proletarian dictatorship, and
eventually abolish the system of private ownership. Social inequality would be eradicated
when the state ultimately withered away, and a classless workers’ utopia would be
realized under communism (Kleinman, 2000: 130). Considering the dynamism of global
capitalism, and the fact that the proletariat has failed to accomplish the revolutionary role
that Marx and Engels once ascribed to its constituents, theories that are supposedly
couched in the dogma of economic determinism have been repudiated by the traditional
intelligentsia.
Differentiating Between Class Consciousness and False Consciousness:
Within developed, and underdeveloped capitalist societies, the intensification of
exploitation, and perpetual impoverishment of the proletariat, has failed to produce the
conditions necessary for class struggle. Many bourgeois commentators have postulated
that the absence of revolutionary determination is indicative of the ideological demise of
Marxism. Still, critical intellectuals, who remain fundamentally aligned with the Marxist
tradition, maintain that human emancipation is predicated upon the masses developing a
genuine class consciousness. Though Marx did not formulate a coherent theory of class
consciousness, his distinction between a “class in itself” and a “class for itself” has
served as the conceptual foundation for the analysis of this historical phenomenon.
A class in itself denotes a categorization of individuals that merely share a
common relationship to the means of production. This classification is applicable to the
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working-classes of both the Global North and Global South. While these workers
objectively constitute a class in opposition to capital, they remain incognizant of their
conflictive connection with the dominant class. In contrast, a class for itself refers to a
group of individuals that have attained a genuine understanding of their objective position
within the hierarchy of power relations, and a subjective awareness of their common
grievances against the dominant class (Swingewood, 1975: 113).
Class consciousness can be differentiated from the conception of false
consciousness. The latter refers to a state of delusion that arises when exploited group
members accept the prevailing worldview that has been manufactured to protect and
serve the interests of powerful elites. An individual that acts contrary to his or her own
self-interests, or class interests, is thought to be suffering from false consciousness.
Scholars within the Marxist tradition have used the theory of false consciousness to
explain the proletariat’s complacency, and the unconsummated revolutionary drama that
was envisioned in the “Manifesto”. Nevertheless, while Marx was cognizant of the
illusory nature of ideology, he never explicitly used the term in his writings.
The concept was originally introduced in a letter written by Engels, and later
developed in the carceral writings of Gramsci, the highly influential neo-Marxist theorist
and Italian politician. Gramsci reasoned that class domination is not exclusively sustained
through material wealth or political power (Seidman, 2012: 133). Within capitalist
societies, the ruling class also actively imposes its ideology on to the common people in
order to legitimize, and reinforce, its dominant position. Since inequalities can potentially
produce conflict and generate social upheaval, Gramsci ascertained that the oppressors
must successfully attain the consent of the oppressed to achieve a state of “unstable
equilibrium” (Williams, 2006: 178).
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Today, this task is accomplished through the mass diffusion of bourgeois class
culture and political values within the institutions of civil society. Members of the
working-class accept, and internalize, the prevailing worldview of the dominant class as
commonsensical and natural due to a relentless process of cultural and political
conditioning. In the “Prison Notebooks”, Gramsci referred to the project of consensus
building as cultural hegemony. Prior to the advent of the industrial revolution, dominant
classes employed brute force in order to maintain exploitative power relations.
In capitalist societies, socio-political order relies heavily upon a delicate balance
between coercion and consent (Ornstein and Stevenson, 1999: 24). Coercion is typically
reserved for extreme dissonance since the consent of the dominated sufficiently
guarantees the production of docile bodies, and the maintenance of social control. Class
rule is perceived to be democratic rule by the great masses of the population since the
inherent contradictions of the mode of production are obfuscated by the dominant
ideology (Seidman, 2012: 137).
Despite the highly incisive, and deeply profound, analyses presented within the
“Prison Notebooks”, arguments predicated upon the logic of false consciousness have
fallen into disrepute. Berger (1975: 34) charges that false consciousness is a highly
problematic contention since it presupposes that “…lower-class people do not understand
their own situation, that they are in need of enlightenment on the matter, and that this
service can be provided by selected higher-class individuals”. According to Berger’s line
of reasoning, false consciousness is a pejorative theoretical proposition which is founded
upon the intellectual superiority of an exalted group of individuals who can objectively
know, and define, what constitutes ‘reality’. Considering that ideologies selectively
illuminate and conceal the ontological conditions of reality, the social world is never
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objectively accessible to observers irrespective of their intellectual or cognitive capacities
(Allahar and Côté, 1998: 1).
McLaverty (2005: 52) further problematizes the vanguardist implications of
consciousness raising exercises by compellingly arguing that social classes are not
homogenous groupings. Within post-colonial capitalist societies, distinctive markers of
identity like race and ethnicity intersect and compound to determine an individual’s
position within the social stratification hierarchy. Consequently, objective interests
cannot be reduced exclusively to economic terms since members of the proletariat may
face divergent trajectories depending on their membership in racial, ethnic, or other nonclass-based groupings.
It should be noted that while discernible differences exist between race and
ethnicity, these concepts are often used interchangeably within academia to distinguish
between groups that claim to share a myth of common descent, as well as linguistic and
cultural similarities (James and Goetze, 2001: 32). According to Bonacich (1972: 548),
“[t]he difference between race and ethnicity lies in the size of the locale from which a
group stems, races generally coming from continents, and ethnicities from national subsections of continents”. In the past, race was assumed to have a biological foundation
however, genomic studies of human populations have revealed that “…there is more
variation within races than between them” (Williams, 2001: 4833). Thus, like ethnicity
which is determined by cultural factors, most scientists agree that race is primarily a
social construct (Douglas, 2011; Mahtani, 2014; Calvert and Terry, 2005).
Socially constructed identity markers must be understood in relation to the
Thomas Principle: “if [people] define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences” (Quoted in Merton, 1995: 340). Despite the fact that both race and
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ethnicity are devoid of biological dimensions, being born black has very real
consequences in traditional and modern societies. Colour prejudice is especially prevalent
in the contested Sikh homeland of Punjab, in which the untouchable Mahazabis and
Dalits reside in large numbers. Akin to the historically oppressed Aboriginal population
of Canada, the dark-skinned untouchables of Punjab are the first people of the Indian
subcontinent. According to Rathna (2014: 21):
Dalits have been treated worse than animals…They are
ordained to do menial jobs and even prohibited to share the
natural resources like water with the upper castes. Even
their very sight and touch have been considered as impure
and taboo….Their subhuman life has been accepted by
them as well as the upper castes as an order of the life
(Rathna, 2014: 20).
In 2012, the National Crime Records Bureau reported that every two minutes, somewhere
in India, an untouchable is victimized (Quoted in Ambedkar, 2014: 27). Upper-caste Sikh
zamindars (landowners), who have multiple Dalits and Mahzabis under their employ,
have perpetrated profound violence against members of the downtrodden castes. In one
high profile case, a group of Jats cleaved off the arms and legs of a Sikh Mazhabi who
filed a police complaint against them for gang-raping his daughter (Human Rights Watch,
2007: 60). Paradoxically, Sikhs adhere to a religious text which condemns violence
against women, and discrimination on the basis of caste.
Phenotypical features and primordial statuses also affect resource allocation, and
the distribution of non-material assets and privileges within ‘progressive’ countries like
Canada. Studies have consistently demonstrated that Canadian-born visible minorities,
and foreign-born immigrants, face “…overt prejudice and systemic discrimination in
housing, education, employment and the justice system, and in places of recreation and
worship” (Christensen, 2009: 212). Despite these empirical realities, vulgar Marxists
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maintain that non-class-based identification constitutes false consciousness since racial
allegiances, and ethnic loyalties, distract individuals from realizing the genuine economic
basis of exploitation. In the economic determinist discourses advanced by these theorists,
the differential lived experiences of post-colonial subjects, and their vulnerable
positionalities in dominant hegemonic institutions, have either been willfully disregarded
or unconsciously ignored.
In reality, within societies that are internally fragmented on the basis of caste,
race, and ethnicity, an individual that fails to acknowledge the importance of
phenotypical and cultural markers of identity may arguably be suffering from false
consciousness. Still, even though racial or ethnic awareness cannot be relegated to the
status of false consciousness, social justice cannot be achieved by exclusively focusing
on the systemic, or institutional forms of oppression faced by visible minorities. As
astutely conveyed by Marx and Engels in the “Manifesto”, inequality can only be
eradicated through the abolition of private property, and the institution of communism.
Progressive global change is contingent upon the interiorization of disparate
socio-political movements for racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual equity under the larger
project of revolutionary class struggle. Social class is not only the fundamental source of
human suffering within developed and underdeveloped countries, but it also represents
the most viable vehicle for generating collective consciousness and solidarity. Yet,
practical politics, which are based predominantly on the similarities that people share as
national and global constituents, have been displaced in favour of politics revolving
around private identities and difference (Elshstain, 1995: 27).
Identity may not be reducible simply to class position however, inequalities
stemming from socially constructed racial and ethnic categories can best be understood in

16

relation to the historical materialist perspective. A genuine sociological appreciation of
these identity markers recognizes that people use ascriptive classifications to heuristically
differentiate between affluence and scarcity, and between the core and periphery (Shils,
1968: 283). While opportunities for vertical class mobility are highly constrained in both
India and Canada, the symbolic importance ascribed to non-dominant phenotypical,
ethnic, and cultural identity markers varies inversely with the acquisition of economic
capital. Gordon Lewis’s (1983: 10; emphasis added) famous aphorism substantiates this
claim: “…in U.S. society, money talks; in Caribbean society, money whitens”.
In line with neo-Marxist theory, non-class markers of identity like caste, race and
ethnicity should be understood as the epiphenomena of class division and the social
relations of production. Nonetheless, this argument should not detract from the hardships
and lived experiences of those that endure other forms of subjugation. While
acknowledging the multidimensional basis of inequality, the discussion that follows will
attempt to qualify the conception of false consciousness since it is still useful for
understanding how hegemonic social control is maintained in both core, and periphery,
capitalist societies despite bourgeoning inequalities.
SECTION II: RETHINKING GLOBAL SOLIDARITY AND PROLETARIAN
INTERNATIONALISM
The Unfulfilled Promise of Modernity:
Political-economic sociologists have employed Marxian class theory to undertake
exhaustive analyses of the (d)evolution of capitalism in the age of globalization. Critical
scholarship in the arts and humanities has been dominated by the study of globalization
however, precise conceptualization of the phenomenon has been severely complicated by
theoretical ambiguities pertaining to its historical origins, and long-term consequences
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(Hebron and Stack, 2011: 17). In its current phase, globalization can be understood as a
pattern of accelerated geopolitical interdependence that has been promoted, and
reinforced, by the universal ascendance and application of neoliberal policies and
institutional practices (Woodley, 2015: 177).
Initially popularized by the ultra-conservative Thatcher and Reagan
administrations, neoliberalism refers to a controversial political-economic ideology that is
predicated upon the logic of radical laissez-faire market principles, and deregulatory
mechanisms. Ideologues of neoliberal macroeconomic doctrine stipulate that state
intervention should be minimized in the ‘free’ market since it is unconducive to growth
and development (Chomsky, 1999: 7). In stark contrast to the scholars and economists
intellectually aligned with the Marxist tradition, proponents of neoliberal policies argue
that private sector interests should retain unfettered control over the market economy
(Harvey, 2005: 3).
Market fundamentalists reason that the invisible hands of capitalism provide
effective regulatory mechanisms for the ‘free’ flow of goods, services, labour, and money
across international borders and territories. Open borders, which accommodate
international trade and commerce, will inevitably produce a society of affluence when the
“…profitability of capital drip[s] down the social pyramid to benefit the poor” (Paupp,
2009: 1). Globalists, and other uncritical advocates of neoliberal hegemony, have failed
to account for the uneven development trajectories of newly industrialized countries like
India, and the inadvertent repercussions of globalization.
The rise of corporate tyranny, far-flung sweatshops, pervasive global economic
disparity, and widespread ecological destruction are amongst the mass of insoluble
problems associated with globalization and the ‘self-regulating’ marketplace. Recently,
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public awareness has heightened in response to the ubiquitous and incessant nature of
these deeply problematic tendencies. Still, the economic system has remained immune,
and perhaps even fortified by the endemic crises of production. In order to understand the
fundamental contradictions of this new era of neoliberal capitalism, Marxism must be
retained in the form of a “living project” (Bartolovich and Lazarus, 2002: 16).
The “Manifesto” continues to represent a politically and intellectually
indispensable directive in what Klein (2007) refers to as the age of “disaster capitalism”.
Not only do Marx’s writings continue to provide highly relevant and critical diagnoses of
the mode and relations of production, but they also present a view of an egalitarian future
devoid of exploitation and human suffering (McLennan, 1999: 564). Even the most
superficial analysis of the “Manifesto” reveals that Marx (1848: 12; emphasis added) was
cognizant of the dynamic ordering of production, and the fluidity of economic capital:
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products
chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the
globe…All old-established national industries have been
destroyed…In place of the old local and national seclusion
and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction,
universal inter-dependence of nations. The bourgeoisie, by
the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by
the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws
all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation.
This lengthy passage not only exemplifies the veracity and prophetic astuteness of
Marx’s observations, but also the profound Eurocentrism upon which his analysis was
centered. In his other works, Marx also famously proclaimed that countries like India and
China were inhabited by “semi-barbaric” and “semi-civilized” populations that were
devoid of history (Ganguly, 1979: 117). Although the homogenization and
hierarchization of entire cultures is undoubtedly problematic, Marx was fundamentally
concerned with the project of global social justice.
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At the heart of Marx’s (1848: 22) polemical treatise is an exhortatory call to
action: “working men of all countries, unite”. Though the proletariat would initially
contend with the oppressors of their respective homelands, Marx envisioned that class
struggle would eventually transcend the confines of national borders. Ascriptive
characteristics, and nationalist sentiments, were consequently depreciated by Marx since
he was aware that they promoted divisiveness, and were unconducive to proletarian
internationalism. Like other modernist theorists, Marx mistakenly presumed that “…in
the wake of modernization and secularism, irrational considerations such as race or blind
ethnic allegiance would give way to rational and universalist factors such as class” (Ryan,
2005: vii; emphasis added).
Traditional identities and ‘irrational’ allegiances have not only persisted, they
have become more salient for their bearers during the period of global capitalism. This
major theoretical oversight represents the biggest failure of orthodox Marxist theory
(Allahar, 2005: 12). Considering that the proletariat has failed to develop a revolutionary
class consciousness, and the fact that identity has become an ever-more complex and
elusive concept during the contemporary era, Marx’s promise of modernity has failed to
materialize.
Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Ethnic Violence:
Reforms predicated upon the logic of neoliberalism have resulted in the erosion of
sovereign autonomy, which was once exclusively exercised by the nation-state over its
respective population. In the altered terrain of contemporary geopolitics, elected officials
have been stripped of their ability to govern, while the state apparatus has been reduced
to a superconductor for surplus value extraction, and capitalist profit maximization
(Hebron and Stack, 2011; Allahar and Côté, 1998). This being the case, Chomsky
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indicates that within ‘democratic’ countries like Canada and India, “…elite elements
based in the business community control the state by virtue of their dominance of the
private society, while the population observes quietly” (Chomsky, 1990: 6). Despite
periodic elections, and ostensible changes in national leadership, political, economic, and
social policy is dictated by domestic economic interests, and transnational corporate
entities, since governmental bodies are dependent upon them for investment capital, as
well as job creation (Allahar and Côté, 1998: 14).
While the significance of existing demarcated and socially constructed borders
has diminished, globalization has attributed new importance to imagined political
communities and ethno-nationalist separatist movements. Eitzen (2006: 211) fittingly
compares the phenomenon of globalization to the Hindu deity Shiva since it “…is not
only a great destroyer, but also a powerful creator of new ideas”. The recent proliferation
of global communication technologies, and social networking outlets, has afforded
oppressed groups new opportunities for converting long-standing ethno-cultural
grievances into demands for self-determination and separatism. The Sikhs are among the
growing number of stateless groups who have attempted to promote, and politicize, their
communal identity to achieve nationalist objectives including secession (Amoretti and
Bermeo, 2004: 288).
Before considering the emergence of Khalistani ethno-nationalism in Punjab, and
the propagation of the Canadian Sikh diaspora (herein referred to as the Sikh diaspora), it
is first necessary to clarify the meaning of some relevant concepts in the migration
literature. As previously suggested, the term ethnicity is used to differentiate between
groups that share distinctive socio-cultural attributes, and adhere to a myth of common
genealogical descent. It is important to note that while ethnicity is ascriptive, and
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boundaries for in-group and out-group membership are socially constructed, individuals
can share emotional affinities with their co-ethnics that can be as intense as
consanguineal bonds (Allahar, 2005: 235).
Although prospects for proletarian internationalism have continually diminished
due to the lack of subjective class identification in developed and underdeveloped
societies, ethnicity has gained new salience in the politics of decolonization and nationbuilding. In the present context, nationalism refers to the shared ideology of a group of
people that have sovereign authority over a clearly demarcated territory, or the process
whereby individuals who claim to share common characteristics coalesce in order to
achieve independence and establish a homeland (Allahar, 2005; Bishku, 2010). Anderson
(1983: 6) claims that a nation is "…imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members… yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion". Thus, like ethnic groupings, nations can be conceived of as
fictive constructions since they are not rooted in objective or material reality.
Yet, Colvard (1998: vii) conveys that when opportunistic political leaders, or
ethnic entrepreneurs, inculcate and mobilize their co-ethnics using elaborate mythologies
of chosen people, the result can be real bloodshed. The Sikh Ghallughara (holocaust)
represents one of the many violent manifestations of ethno-nationalism during the
twentieth century. Even though ethnic mobilization has historically resulted in violent
pogroms and purgative attacks, nationalism can also be a unifying force which is capable
of generating collective effervescence. Today, members of transnational diasporas, who
are physically separated but still emotionally tied to their countries of origin, endure the
profound impact of global uprooting through ethnic loyalties, and national affiliation.

22

Transnational Diasporas and Ethnic Enclaves:
Traditional ethnic loyalties have persisted despite the significant challenge of
cosmopolitanism which has been posed by the transnational flow of people from the
periphery to the core regions, and vice-versa (Sutherland, 2012: ix). Mass migration has
facilitated the creation of diasporic communities by enabling the transmission of diverse
populations, and their distinctive ethno-cultural elements, beyond ancestral homelands.
The by-product of loosening territorial ties, the diaspora is a “home away from home”
(Allahar, 2010: 62) that is composed of immigrants that share the same nationality, but
have settled outside of their country of origin either voluntarily or involuntarily.
While diasporas appeal to the primordial ideas of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, these
movements are transnational since they span across nation-states (Dusenbery, 2005: 485).
Within the confines of demarcated borders, diasporas tend to have perceptible
geographical and residential locations sometimes referred to as ethnic enclaves. The
densely populated suburban community of Brampton-Springdale, colloquially known as
‘Singhdale’, is one of many ethnic enclaves that has emerged in Canada over the past
several decades. Sikh secessionist leaders, and organized militant groups, have drawn
considerable moral, economic, and social support from their co-ethnics that have settled
within this immigrant-receiving hub.
The proliferation of diasporas is in direct opposition to the melting pot theory of
ethnic relations which held sway in the migration literature for several decades
(Hirschman, 1983: 399). In the past, classical assimilation theorists postulated that
immigrants incorporated into the host country over time by adopting mainstream norms
and values (Alba and Nee, 1997: 328). Assimilation was presumed to follow a straight
line trajectory in which, upward social mobility in both education and occupation, were
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normative expectations associated with successful cultural integration (Waters et al.,
2010: 1168). Nonetheless, first, second, and even third-generation immigrants, are
actively retaining their distinctive traditions and cultural identities as opposed to
discarding them.
A large body of scholarly research has been developed on the segmented
assimilation trajectories of immigrant youth. Segmented assimilation refers to the process
whereby individuals either end up “…ascending into the ranks of a prosperous middle
class, or join in large numbers the ranks of a racialized, permanently impoverished
population at the bottom of society” (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller, 2005: 1004).
Allahar (2011: 66) hypothesizes that diasporas are populated by the latter group of
immigrants since identification with these types of communities is class-differentiated.
Typically, individuals who possess greater social, cultural, and economic capital are less
likely to identify, or reside within, diasporic communities than their lower-class
compatriots.
Studies have revealed that immigrants with higher SES are usually better
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by displacement, relocation and integration
(Lansford, 2011; Jardine, 2008). Xie and Greenman (2011: 966) found that immigrants
with lower SES incorporated into the host society much more gradually than their higher
SES counterparts and that, the latter group had higher educational achievement and
elevated psychological well-being. These discrepancies may be attributable to the fact
that children of low SES immigrants tend to face similar barriers to social and economic
integration as their parents did (Palameta, 2007: 4). Osterberg (2000: 157) established a
link between low educational attainment amongst first-generation immigrants and poorer
outcomes in the labour market for their offspring. A number of other studies have
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corroborated that socioeconomic factors account significantly for the differential
experiences of second-generation immigrant youth (Nielsen et al., 2001; Van Ours and
Veenman, 2002).
The social organization of the receiving community also has significant
implications for the adaptation patterns of immigrant youth. If, for instance, the
immigrant community is highly concentrated into an ethnic enclave, assimilation is not
always necessary for integration. Danzer and Yaman (2013: 211) contend that the
“…presence of co-ethnics increases migrants' interaction cost with natives and thus
reduces the likelihood of integration”. Moreover, since diasporic communities tend to
develop culturally exclusive, and mutually self-interacting institutions which run parallel
to ones which already exist in the host country, integration is further obstructed (Allahar,
2011: 69).
This form of closed-off social organization within diasporic communities is
referred to as institutional completeness (Breton, 1964: 193). When a diasporic
community becomes institutionally complete, jobs, goods and services become readily
available to co-ethnics within the confines of the enclave. Interactions with ethnic
entrepreneurs from the homeland, and the ready availability of familiar foods and music,
are all conducive to the retention of diasporic identity.
Nonetheless, in any capitalist society, resources and jobs are scarce while
competition is high. Immigrants who perceive an imbalance of opportunity are more
likely to prospect beyond the social boundaries of the diaspora. Since immigrants
typically drift away over time as a consequence of occupational mobility, diasporas are
generally typified as stable working-class communities (Allahar, 2011: 65). Moreover,
when the children and grandchildren of immigrants move away from these enclaves,
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economic and social integration become much more likely. Outside of the enclave,
immigrants are afforded greater opportunity for interaction with the native-born
population, and ethnic or racial intermarriage which may shift or blur diasporic identities
(Qian and Lichter, 2007: 68).
While assimilation may be a pursuable goal for some immigrant groups,
resembling the dominant group in the receiving society may not necessarily be a ‘free’, or
rational choice others can make (Torres, 2003: 51). Immigrants that have dissimilar
phenotypical attributes, or those that dress in distinctive cultural apparel, may never be
able to integrate fully into the host society due to widespread xenophobia, or the presence
of structural racism. Ghuman (1997: 31) acknowledges that “[t]he state of race relations
in the wider society affects young people's perception of how far they are willing to go in
their adaptation process, which can range from assimilation on the one hand, to
separation on the other”. If racism and discrimination are rampant, identification with the
diaspora may be the only viable option available to visible minority group members.
SECTION III: THE CASE OF KHALISTANI ETHNO-NATIONALISM
The Sikh Qaum and the Land of Five Rivers:
The ethnonational aspirations of the Sikh community emerged in Punjab during
the abdication of colonial rule. For over two centuries, the British Raj successfully
employed divide and rule strategies to retain social control over the heterogeneous Indian
population, while simultaneously exercising unparalleled political-economic domination
over the vast resources concentrated within the semiautonomous Princely States.
Following the culmination of the Second World War, violent and non-violent struggles
between the colonizers and the colonized became pronounced. Eventually, the British
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Empire was forced to relinquish ownership of the Crown jewel over to pro-independence,
indigenous elites.
The Punjabi-Sikhs, and their co-ethnics settled abroad, played a pivotal role in the
Indian Independence Movement. Yet, polarized Hindu and Muslim visions of the postcolonial state generated new anxieties in the Sikh psyche. The two-nation boundary
demarcation line, which was proposed by the competing nationalist elite, would
effectively rupture Punjab and divide the Sikh constituency (Telford, 1992: 969). Like
other ethnic minority groups in India, the Sikhs of Punjab recognized that the
implementation of the territorial partition arrangement would result in large-scale losses
in political power, land ownership, and control over the community’s religious shrines
(Kudaisya and Yong, 2004: 122). Consequently, alongside the dominant All-Indian
Muslim League, and the powerful Indian National Congress (INC), the Sikh-centric
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) submitted its Azad (independent) Punjab Scheme during
partition planning.
Punjab had represented the traditional homeland of the Sikhs prior to the
institution of Crown rule, as well as the primordial anchorage of the Khalsa Panth (pure
community). On the basis of these ancient territorial claims, the architects of the Azad
Punjab Scheme defined the Sikhs as a qaum (nation), and demanded a sovereign
homeland that would ensure the preservation of their distinctive social, cultural, and
religious identity (Chima, 2008; Spickard, 2005). The Sikh political leaders adamantly
voiced their disapproval of the envisioned political borders of India and Pakistan, which
they alleged would manifest respectively in Hindu and Muslim tyranny (McLeod, 2008:
91).
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Axel (2001: 81) notes that members of the SAD were internally divided on the
issue of political secession. Some were in favour of a united India, in which significant
political leverage was awarded to the SAD. Others insisted that, if Pakistan was to be
acceded by the British, the Northern state of Punjab should also be detracted from Hindudominated India to form Khalistan. Despite conflicting views among members of the
SAD, the party remained unified around its central goal of maximizing autonomy in the
affairs of Punjab. As opposed to perpetual servitude, the landed Sikh gentry, which
occupied the SAD’s political ranks, sought “…a share in political power and not merely a
change of masters” (Singh, 2014: 2). Nevertheless, the Azad Punjab scheme was deemed
unfeasible and the Sikh leadership became marginalized in the politics of decolonization
and nation-building.
The SAD eventually acquiesced to the INC’s ‘secular’ vision of the Indian nationstate upon being granted assurances for special status in the administrative and
constitutional affairs of Punjab (Riar, 2006: 58). Still, despite the Sikh leaders’
cooperation, concerted efforts to placate and unify the principal proponents of Pakistan
under an ‘inclusionary’ Indian nationalist agenda were largely ineffective. Therefore, the
Boundary Commission reluctantly mandated that the vast subcontinent be divided on the
basis of seemingly irreconcilable religious differences between British India’s Hindu and
Islamic communities (Mason and Mason, 1997: 259). The implementation of the
Mountbatten partition plan, and the dissolution of the British Raj, resulted in the
formation of the independent dominions of India and Pakistan on August 15th, 1947.
Unprecedented communal violence erupted between Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims
within the newly formed state borders. Though the colonial power withdrew almost
completely unscathed, an estimated one million people perished in the process of
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partition, and over twelve million others were displaced during the mass population
transfers that took place in the land of five rivers (Zamindar, 2013: 58). When the dust
settled, and the “fratricidal bloodbath” subsided, the INC inherited power from the
colonial regime and emerged as the central governing body of the Republic of India
(Fanon, 1961: 17).
Despite the enticing political promises made by the Indian nationalist leadership,
the Constituent Assembly immediately rescinded the special recognition that was to be
granted to the Sikh community for their loyalty, and significant contributions to the
struggle for independence (Singh and Tatla, 2006: 67). Due to the Sikhs minority status
within the Hindu-dominated peripheral state, this decision rendered the SAD virtually
powerless in the governance of Punjab. In an effort to widen their constituency, and
achieve greater political autonomy, the SAD launched the Punjab Suba (province)
movement during the first legislative assembly elections in 1952. By this time, the Sikh
political leadership had joined the “…chorus of peripheral protests [which] arose as
minorities and disadvantaged classes began to see that the independence promise of an
egalitarian and secular India was not being fully met” (Mahmood, 2014: 572).
Though the SAD’s movement was initially unsuccessful, sustained extraparliamentary agitation forced the INC to accede to the creation of a culturally, and
linguistically congruent Punjab Suba in 1966 (Telford, 1992: 969). Under the leadership
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the united multilingual state was divided into the
predominantly Hindi-speaking Haryana and Himachal Pradesh regions, while the
remaining areas, except for Chandigarh, formed the new unilingual Punjab
(Juergensmeyer, 2014: 388).

29

Before the linguistic reorganization of the state in 1966, Sikhs had only
constituted 35% of the total state population (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 67). As a result
of trifurcation, they formed a 60% majority in the Punjab Suba (Chiriyankandath, 2016:
56). Nevertheless, the SAD’s political victory came at a heavy cost. Under the Punjab
Reorganization Act, the central government managed to achieve exclusive control over
the transfer of natural resources between the newborn states. Whereas the lush forested
areas and abundant mineral wealth were reallocated to Haryana and Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab was left solely with its river waters (Singh, 1997: 36).
Even after the uneven redistribution of the eco-rich land, the SAD remained
internally fragmented. Most members reiterated their pre-independence demand for a
separate Sikh homeland within India. Yet, from the margins, others continued to vocalize
demands for political secession and Khalistan. In spite of competing solutions to the
Punjab problem, the SAD managed to consolidate support for greater regional autonomy
from the majority Sikh electorate, while remaining in a state of perpetual mobilization
against the central government in Delhi.
In an effort to correct the lame reorganization of the Suba, the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution (ASR) was drafted and proposed to the central government in 1973 by the
SAD. The resolution, which was heavily couched in orthodox Sikh dogma, was primarily
concerned with the level of centralization developing in the affairs of Punjab. In total,
forty-five economic, cultural, religious, and constitutional demands were made in order to
renegotiate the balance of power between the central and state government (Basran and
Bolaria, 2004: 75).
The first ASR was dismissed when Gandhi declared a state of emergency, and
established dictatorial control over India. As opposed to devolving power to the states,
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for a twenty-one month period the Prime Minister employed extra-constitutional
authority to rule over the vast nation by decree (Bharat, 2015: 11). State elections were
suspended, slums were razed to the ground, and many of Gandhi’s political adversaries
were detained and tortured illegally (Chakrabarty, 2016: 161). In addition to these gross
human right abuses, a mass-sterilization campaign was also initiated in the ‘democratic’
republic (Dwivedi and Rajan 2016: 155). Towards the end of the emergency period,
Gandhi insidiously facilitated the induction of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale into the
politics of the SAD.
The puritan Sikh leader, Bhindranwale, was installed in order to dispel the sway
of ethno-nationalism, and to further accentuate political divisions within the SAD (Vohra,
1986: 1738). In the end, however, Gandhi’s campaign of manipulation had highly
destructive and unintended consequences. When state elections were reinstated,
Bhindranwale joined the SAD’s political struggle for Sikh sovereignty. In collaboration
with the Sikh political leadership, Bhindranwale initiated a Dharam Yudh Morcha
(righteous struggle) and revived the ASR (Singh, 2007: 560). In response, Gandhi
classified the ASR as a secessionist document and vilified the entire Sikh community as
treasonous and anti-Indian (Mahmood, 2014: 571).
The Khalistani ethno-nationalist movement reached its zenith when Bhindranwale
successfully converted the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) into a mass
support base, and began his proselytizing program of Amrit Prachar (baptisms) in Punjab.
While preaching for a return to austere living and Sikh orthodoxy to responsive
audiences, Bhindranwale also put forward a historical narrative centered upon Hindu
betrayal:
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The Hindus are trying to enslave us; atrocities against the
Sikhs are increasing day by day under the Hindu imperialist
rulers of New Delhi; the Sikhs have never felt so
humiliated, not even during the reign of the Moghul
emperors and British colonialists. How long can the Sikhs
tolerate injustice? (Telford, 1992: 975).
Bhindranwale and his followers eventually rejected the SAD’s ‘moderate’ political
agenda. Instead, they fortified themselves within the Harmandir Sahib Complex (also
known as the Golden Temple) and began to stockpile arms.
From within the precincts of the holy shrine, the militant revolutionary drew
attention to the SAD’s contradictory religious and political-economic priorities: “we are
losing our identity, and the interest of our Sikh leaders who have their farms and their
industries at heart have started making them say that there is no difference between Sikh
and Hindus” (Quoted in Rapoport, 2013: 181). Sikhs began to revere Bhindranwale as a
sant-sipahi (saint-soldier) which allowed him to develop a cult-like following (Pettigrew,
1995: 21). For nearly two years, Bhindranwale and his followers occupied the Golden
temple and reigned terror on Punjab and surrounding areas. Police officers, state officials,
Sikhs of lax faith, and non-Sikh civilians were targeted and mercilessly murdered by proKhalistani factions.
The rise of Sikh fundamentalism in Punjab eventually elicited a response from the
central government in Delhi. In order to apprehend Bhindranwale, and put an end to the
Khalistan movement, Gandhi sanctioned Operation Blue Star, and the Indian army
subsequently infiltrated the Golden Temple on June 3rd, 1984. Considering that thousands
of Sikh parishioners had arrived at the temple from all over India in observance of
Gurpurb (day of remembrance), the operation was purposefully engineered in order to
maximize death and destruction. Just before the bloody massacre ensued, a curfew was
imposed in Punjab “…with all methods of communication and public travel suspended.
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Electricity supply was also interrupted, creating a total blackout and cutting off the state
from the rest of the world” (Rajeswar, 2015: 111).
The armed Sikhs, who were led by Bhindranwale, were neutralized following
three days of fierce gun fighting, and heavy shelling. The attack also resulted in the death
of over 5000 civilians, and the desecration of temporal center of Khalsa Panth (Kapur,
1986: 137). Operation Bluestar also set into motion a destructive chain of events. Several
months after the attack, Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards. Following
the cremation of the Prime Minister, Hindu mobs, amalgamated with police and state
officials, began combing through villages necklacing Sikh men, raping women, and
dismembering children (Pettigrew, 1995: 37). The Delhi ethnic cleansings led to a
prolonged period of guerrilla warfare and insurgency in Punjab.
Police and paramilitary forces actively engaged in gross human rights violations
during the time. Human Rights Watch (1990: 7) has reported that high-ranking state
officials and security personnel sanctioned “…brutal methods to stem the insurgency,
including arbitrary arrests, torture, prolonged detention without trial, disappearances and
summary killings of civilians and suspected militants”. Moderate Sikhs, who had
vehemently condemned Bhindranwale, became radicalized due to the circumstances
surrounding the Ghallughara, and the extra-judicial killings that took place following the
attack on the Golden Temple.
Ethnic Entrepreneurship and Religious Opiates: The Struggle for Ideological
Hegemony in Punjab
Sikh scholars and human rights activists have attributed the rise of religious
fundamentalism in Punjab, and the virulent demand for the theocratic state of Khalistan,
to the political marginalization of the community in post-independence India (Pruthi,
2004; Kumar et al., 2003; Singh, 2013). In reality, however, the crisis in the contested
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homeland was precipitated by the protracted hegemonic struggle which ensued between
elite ethnic entrepreneurs in the Sikh and Hindu communities, as well as the
socioeconomic contradictions of peripheral capitalist development. As in other parts of
the Indian subcontinent, competing ethno-nationalist ideologies generated profound intergroup conflict, and intensive intra-group competition, in Punjab following the collapse of
the British Empire.
Colonial encounter effectively transformed elite members of the Hindu ethnic
community, who held a monopoly over trade and commerce in India since the
culmination of Mughal rule, into the native bourgeoisie (Paranjape, 2012: 21). Dhulipala
(2015: 55) indicates that exposure to the British education system accentuated the Hindu
capitalist class’s subjective awareness of its economic interests, and facilitated the
development of bourgeois consciousness among its members. Following the dissolution
of the Raj, the Hindu bourgeoisie managed to legitimize its dominant position in the
political, economic, and social affairs of India through its representatives in the INC and
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
Due to its pivotal role in the Independence Movement, the INC has sustained
mass appeal among the heterogeneous Indian electorate. While explicitly enunciating
secular ideals, the party has implicitly adhered to the ideology of Hindutva since its
formation (Swain, 2001: 93). As opposed to the INC, leaders of the BJP have actively
identified India as the critical site of Hindu Jagriti (awakening), and openly professed
their desire for Bharat Mata to be governed in accordance with the “great teachings of the
Vedas” (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2016).
Today, despite the fact that religious pluralism is enshrined in the constitution, the
state apparatuses coalition with the right-wing ideological think tank the Rashtriya
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Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the militant Bajrang Dal, reveal that India is
fundamentally a Hindu nation (Verdeja and Smith, 2013: 84). For the most part, the
BJP’s Hindutva orientation, and the INC’s ‘secular’ political strategy, have been
conducive to social stability since the Indian population predominantly belongs to the
Hindu faith, and because ideological sanctions for pervasive power, wealth, and status
differentials are inherently built into the Vedic scriptures (Tatla, 2006: 43). For obvious
reasons, however, the implementation of Hindu ethnocracy has generated considerable
resentment among ethno-religious minority groups in post-independence India.
Shortly after Punjab was partitioned, conflicting factions in the Sikh community
advanced counter-hegemonic cultural discourses against the central rulers in Delhi. The
homeland struggle was initiated by the SAD, and eventually hijacked by the militant
orthodox priest Bhindranwale, and his army composed primarily of peasant insurgents
(Telford, 1992: 970). Historically, Akali leaders have projected themselves as the
exclusive spiritual and political custodians of the Khalsa Panth by employing the
orthodox doctrine of Miri-Piri, which “…implies that the Sikhs constitute not merely a
fraternity of the faith followers but also a political community in the sense of a sovereign
peoplehood” (Ahluwalia, 2003: 12). Yet, internal dissension and disunity in the political
community is exhibited by the stark class, caste, and sect cleavages that exist between
Sikhs, as well as the antithetical post-independence goals pursued by their leaders (Tatla,
2006: 12).
The deterioration of communal relations, and the armed uprising in Punjab, must
be understood in relation to the concrete class interests of the principal exponents of
Khalistan since ethnies are not universally homogenous groups, and because economic
incentives exist for seizing state power in post-colonial societies (Allahar, 2008: 1). In
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Punjab, the Sikh-centric SAD has overtly asserted itself as the champions of Khalsa,
while covertly catering to the class interests of the agrarian rich Jats (Baaklini and
Desfosses, 2016: 148). Control over religious shrines, schools, and the highly lucrative
Shiromnani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), has allowed the SAD to define
Sikh identity, and homogenize the interests of the entire community in accordance with
the political-economic objectives of the Sikh bourgeoisie (Tatla, 1999: 18).
The affinity between India’s public and private sectors is affirmed by the
commercial interests of party leaders at the national, state, and district levels. Sukhbir
Singh Badal, the reigning president of the SAD, and his predecessors, have utilized the
profits accrued from industrialized agricultural practices to purchase political power in
Punjab (Sidhu, Brar, and Punia, 2009: 48). Badal, and his political rivals that occupy the
ranks of the INC and BJP, have managed to actively mask their bourgeois class-caste
interests by disseminating communal ideologies, and mobilizing members of their
respective ethno-religious communities on the basis of primordial myths. Consequently,
in post-independence India, the gravediggers of capitalism have been transmuted into
expendable pawns in the national elites’ quest for material domination, and ideological
hegemony.
During its prolonged campaign for regional autonomy, the SAD used religious
appeals to garner support from Punjab’s rural peasantry. By exploiting the illiteracy and
orthodoxy of their principal electorate, the Sikh political leadership insisted that the
preeminence of the community could only be guaranteed if the Indian government
submitted to the ASR. The SAD emphasized the symbolic, theopolitical underpinnings of
the resolution in order to distract underprivileged Sikhs from realizing some of its more
insidious aims. These included the reassessment of minimum wage policies,
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improvements in irrigation facilities, and liberalized credit to support greater agricultural
productivity (Singh, 1984: 45). In reality, the demands outlined in the resolution were
concerned with increasing the profitability of capital-intensive farming practices in
Punjab.
Since the ASR posed a threat to the status-quo, and the economic interests of the
Hindu bourgeoisie, the document was disparaged by Gandhi. During this time, ruling
class hegemony was also challenged in other parts of India, and the central government
was forced to declare a state of emergency. When the Sikhs, and other distinctive ethnoreligious groups that comprised the heterogeneous Indian population could no longer be
kept in line through the project of consensus building, Gandhi employed the state’s
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Security analysts recognized the profound
danger posed by Khalistan, so Gandhi appropriated the divide and rule tactics of the
colonizers, and positioned Bhindranwale as a counterweight against her political rivals in
the SAD (Singh and Fenech, 2014: 90).
The Prime Minister had planned to exploit the religious leader for her personal
political gains, but Bhindranwale managed to ingeniously outmaneuver both the Hindu,
and Sikh bourgeoisie (Tambiah, 1997: 106). Akin to the political leaders of the SAD, and
the INC, Bhindranwale was a rational actor with his own political-economic goals. Under
the patronage of the INC, Bhindranwale had unsuccessfully led an election campaign for
control of the SGPC (Gupte, 2012: 314). The elected committee of representatives, which
manages the finances and daily operations of all Sikh gurdwaras in India, reported an
annual budget of 993 crores ($1,955,846 CAD) in 2015 (The Times of India, 2015).
Although Bhindranwale had already become one of the central religious figures in the
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community by this time, control over the SGPC would have also provided him with
significant economic power.
The Sikh preacher’s support base was generated as a result of the uneven
development trajectory of the Green Revolution, which unequivocally benefitted the Sikh
bourgeoisie (Brown, 1996: 155). Whereas Bhindranwale originated from the prosperous
province of Malwa, Telford (1992: 976) maintains that his band of armed militants
predominantly came from large, and relatively impoverished, Jat families in the Majha
region. Rapid socioeconomic changes in the agricultural sectors of the bordering
Gurdaspur and Amritsar areas of the Majha, had facilitated the pauperization of peasants
with marginal landholdings (Singh, 1984: 43). Since alternate employment avenues were
not available in the industrial sector, many peasants became landless, while others were
subjected to conditions of chronic unemployment.
Prior to the implementation of the Nehruvian model of modernization, and the
proliferation of agribusiness within the region of Punjab, the rural peasantry in these
areas was self-sufficient and cohesive despite ethno-linguistic, cultural, and religious
differences (Misra, 1995: 137). Though class and caste inequalities existed, a significant
proportion of Punjabi families were able to maintain an adequate standard of living
(Klein, 2009: 91). Even the Dalits and Mahzabis were able to achieve sufficient
nutritional sustenance from religious shrines, like the Sikh gurdwara (temple), which
instituted free communal kitchens. Following the inception of technologically intensive
farming practices in Punjab, communal relations deteriorated, and social inequality
increased drastically.
Mechanization, agro-chemicals, and hybridized seeds permitted higher cropping
intensity however, famine, irrigation issues, and high debt burdens began to
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disproportionally affect small landowners (Randhawa, 1975: 71). Thus, while the
dominant Jat landlords were able to capitalize on technological innovation and accrue
vast amounts of profit, smaller Sikh farmers were forcefully dispelled from their ancestral
lands. The imbalanced experiences of the Green Revolution resulted in considerable
political polarization in Punjab politics. For a short period of time, Jat peasants with small
landholdings, and others who did not directly benefit from the Green Revolution, became
aware of their objective position in relations of production.
Support for the Marxist branch of the Bharatiya Communist Party radically
increased in Punjab’s legislative assembly elections following capitalist modernization
(Tatla, 1999: 18). The Naxalite movement was also born in this opportune economic,
social, and political climate. Nonetheless, the cultivation of a genuine class consciousness
amongst Punjab’s agrarian peasantry was short-lived. Instead of making lasting economic
links with Hindu peasants, or the landless Dalits and Mahzabis, small Jat landowners
rallied around the fervently anti-communist Bhindranwale. The Sikh leader not only
blamed the SAD and the INC for the plight of Punjab’s downtrodden farmers, he also
provided copious amounts of religious opiates to the hungry, landless, and impoverished
(Singh, 1984: 44).
Initially, young Jat males from the AISSF joined Bhindranwale since they
perceived allegiance to him as a form of Panthic sewa (community service). However,
militancy began to represent an economically sound ‘career opportunity’ for Sikhs that
belonged to lower-castes, and others who were unemployed, and propertyless (Telford,
1992: 986). When the activities of the pro-Khalistani factions eventually degenerated into
extortion, kidnapping, and mass murder, Bal (2005: 3981) indicates that “…the socioeconomic conditions of the families of militants improved dramatically… they purchased
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agricultural land…built palatial houses, purchased vehicles, trucks and tractors”. By this
time, terrorist violence in the countryside had forced many average Sikh civilians to
withdraw social, moral, and economic support to the militant outfits (Chopra, 2012: 43).
Nevertheless, following the infiltration of the sacred Harmandir Sahib Complex,
Bhindranwale gained the status of a ‘martyr’, and thousands of young men joined the
‘holy war’ against the Indian government. The Khalistani ethno-nationalist movement
also gained considerable support among diasporic Sikhs.
SECTION IV: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN THE CANADIAN SIKH
DIASPORA
Shifting Nationalist Loyalties and the Air India Tragedy:
More than three decades have passed since the Indian Army’s attack on the
Harmandir Sahib Complex, but time has failed to heal the deep-seated wounds produced
by the climate of political opportunism, ethnic entrepreneurship, and inter-communal
violence which plagued post-independence Punjab. For Sikh communities’ settled
overseas, nationalist loyalties with Bharat Mata were severed following the execution of
Operation Blue Star, and the anti-Sikh pogroms that took place after the political
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In Canada, the vast majority of Sikh
immigrants had not identified with the imagined homeland of Khalistan, let alone
supported efforts to achieve secession from India.
Nevertheless, Tatla (1999: 203; emphasis added) notes that the critical event at
the Golden Temple “…brought home a new feeling of endangered and collective fate of
the community scattered in many countries”. When images of the carnage at the
Harmandir Sahib Complex were circulated by the mainstream Canadian press, Sikhs
congregated in gurdwaras (temples) to lament the sacrilege of the community’s holiest
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site of pilgrimage, and to mourn the loss of innocent life on a holy day. Four months
later, when news of the Ghallughara reached the diaspora, sentiments of grief transmuted
into cries for vengeance, holy war, and martyrdom.
On June 23rd 1985, Air India Flight-182 disintegrated over Irish Seas due to the
midair detonation of a concealed bomb that had been loaded in the cargo hold of the
Boeing 747 commercial airliner (Fitzgerald, 2011: 357). Out of the 329 passengers that
were killed during the in-flight explosion, 278 were confirmed to be Canadian citizens
(Bellarsi and Maufort, 2002: 98). Insurgents identifying with the international Babbar
Khalsa outfit were deemed responsible for the bombing plot, and Canada was
subsequently identified as a safe haven for Sikh extremists (Hoffman and Reinares, 2014:
144). Although the alleged perpetrators were eventually apprehended by law enforcement
officials, they were exonerated due to inadequate evidence following one of the longest,
and most expensive, criminal trials in Canadian history (Tatla, 2014: 508). The Air India
Flight-182 tragedy affirmed that, as opposed to disappearing, the Khalistani ethnonationalist movement had matured, and became intensified in the Canadian diasporic
setting.
Today, Canada has become home to the one of the fastest growing Sikh
populations outside of the contested homeland (Nesbitt, 2016: 3). From abroad, Sikh
immigrants, and their Canadian-born descendants, have provided ideological coherency
to the violent separatist movement, as well as economic and moral support to proKhalistani factions geographically situated in India and Pakistan (Guidry, Kennedy, and
Zald, 2000: 329).Whereas the Indian government judiciously sidelined long-standing
Sikh resentment against the ‘secular’ nation-state, and violently repressed insurgency
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efforts, the favorable political climate in Canada has allowed the community to pursue its
dream of homeland in a predominantly democratic fashion.
Unpleasant Truths and Comforting Lies: The Reality of Canada’s ‘Cultural Mosaic’
Sympathizers of the nationalist, political liberation movement remain
concentrated within institutionally complete ethnic enclaves like ‘Singhdale’ and Surrey,
where Sikhs reside in large numbers (Pitter and Lorinc, 2016; Nayar, 2004). Though
these areas have received considerable attention in media reports, ethnic enclaves are not
unique to the Sikh experience in Canada. Many well-established immigrant communities
have managed partially to recreate elements of the old-country within major Canadian
cities. Chinatown, Little Italy and Greektown are clear examples of the changing sociocultural landscape of contemporary Canadian society.
Simmons (2010: 165) suggests that the clustering and clumping of ethno-cultural,
or religious groups, within small geographic areas is non-random. Residential settlement
patterns reveal that a significant proportion of immigrants voluntarily choose to live
around their own kind - people that resemble them phenotypically, or share cultural,
linguistic, or other similarities (Goering, 2007: 108). Although class position and
economic resources ultimately dictate the quality of housing that is available to
individuals or families in Canada, the existence of ethnic enclaves still speaks to the
primordial ideas of home and belonging. The presence of familiar places, faces, foods,
and music not only allow predictability, but they also provide a sense of security for
members of diasporic groups that are settled in a foreign land.
While remaining committed to the struggle for Khalistan, members of the Sikh
diaspora have attempted to create the familiar in an unfamiliar setting. In the Greater
Vancouver, and Greater Toronto Area (GTA), community members have organized
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large-scale nagar kirtans (parades) to commemorate the ‘martyrdom’ of Bhindranwale,
and the ‘sacrifices’ made for the quam by other Khalistani insurgents. In the past, Parmar,
the alleged mastermind of the Flight-182 tragedy, has been among those garlanded during
the annual religious processions (Barlow, 2015: 98). Overt cultural demonstrations like
the nagar kirtan attest that the Sikhs, like other major ethno-cultural and religious
communities in Canada, have generally rejected cultural assimilation in favour of
accommodation within the host country (Gibson, 1988: 24).
Officially, this adaptation pattern has been supported by the Canadian
government’s commitment to inclusive citizenship which remains enshrined in the
official policy of multiculturalism. Yet, empirical realities reveal that some Canadians are
not equally as welcome to participate in the ‘cultural mosaic’ as others. The history of
Sikh migration and settlement within Canada is replete with implicit and explicit racial
discrimination, as well as profound economic exploitation. Akin to other visible minority
groups, the Sikhs were considered to be undesirable immigrants since their unfamiliar
cultural practices had the potential to rupture the delicate fabric of Canadian society, and
consequently threaten social stability (Singh, 2014: 527).
Exclusionary laws like the Continuous Journey Regulation were devised and
implemented in order to preserve the nation’s ethnic and racial integrity. One of the first
challenges to Canada’s xenophobic policy regime was posed by a group of Sikh
immigrants that arrived in the Vancouver harbor chartering the Japanese streamliner, the
Komagata Maru (Johnston, 2014: 9). These Sikhs unsuccessfully defied immigration
restrictions which granted free right of entry almost exclusively to Anglo immigrants, and
restricted admission to the socially, culturally, and morally ‘inferior’ Plinian races. The

43

Komagata Maru incident represents one of the many disgraceful blots in Canadian
history.
Discriminatory immigration policies were only amended due to shortages in
labour that arose when Canada ceased to represent an attractive destination for white
immigrants from Europe and America (Westhues, 2006: 355). Racialized labour was
subsequently imported from periphery countries like China and India under restrictive
quotas (Galabuzi, 2006: 79). The Sikhs, like most racial and ethnic ‘others’ that arrived in
Canada, were forced to work for lower wages than their native-born counterparts
(Hickman, 2014: 36). Moreover, they were ghettoized in the least desirable job sectors,
and often compelled to work under substandard employment conditions (Nayar, 2004:
16). In addition to enduring conditions of profound economic exploitation at the hands of
their employers, early Sikh immigrants were routinely subjected to racially-motivated
aggression due to their distinctive physical appearance (Seiple, Hoover, and Otis, 2013:
90).
Considering that economic opportunities were more readily available in Canada
than in their country of origin, most Sikh immigrants accepted the systemic racism,
ridicule and social segregation they were forced to confront within the host society.
Nevertheless, since neither the government, nor native-born population made an
emotional commitment to the community, most Sikhs remained in Canada exclusively to
make an economic living (Berry and Henderson, 2002: 72). Due to the peasant origins of
the pioneer Sikhs, most amassed capital with the dream of returning home and procuring
land in their ancestral villages which they considered to be a sign of prosperity and
success (Tatla, 1999: 64). A large proportion of their earnings were also remitted to
support dependents that were left behind. Until the eve of Operation Blue Star, the
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majority of Sikh immigrants perceived themselves to be temporary settlers in a foreign,
and alien land.
Though racial equality has vastly improved since the elimination of Canada’s
overt colour bar immigration policies, Sikhs continue to endure discrimination and
xenophobic attitudes from the native-born population, as well as members of other visible
minority groups. For baptized, orthodox Sikhs, who adorn the five external symbols of
the Khalsa Panth, integration into the host society has proven to be exceptionally
difficult. Following the deadly September 11th terror attacks on the World Trade Center,
and recent spate of Islamic extremism in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia, a
sharp rise in hate crimes has been documented against members of overseas Sikh
communities (Zanetti et al, 2014: 129). In the United States, confused and unintelligent
Islamophobes have violently assaulted Sikhs and vandalized their places of worship
under the mistaken assumption that they resemble the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.
Even though Sikhs and Muslims belong to entirely different faiths, Orientalized
depictions of ‘Arabs’ in the Western media continue to generate suspicion and mistrust of
those with turbans, unshorn beards, distinctive cultural apparel, and brown skin. In the
United States, Sikhs have become collateral damage in the lucrative war on terror, and
the ideological project of terror racialization which has been undertaken by national
security agencies and the entertainment media. In the wake of the deadly Oak Creek
shooting rampage, overseas Sikh communities have become more aware of their
vulnerable status in the post-9/11 world. In the Canadian context, violent victimization
against Sikhs has also been reported, but at a comparatively lower incidence than in the
United States (Nahon-Serfaty, 2014: 55).
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Intergenerational Conflict and Cultural Inbetweenity:
Studies of immigrant experiences and adaptation patterns carry the risk of overgeneralization, but there is evidence which suggests that norms of racism and cultural
chauvinism also operate within the Sikh diaspora. In the migration literature, social
scientists have used rates of intermarriage “…as a measure of decreasing social distance,
declining prejudice, and changing group boundaries” (Lee and Bean, 2007: 382). Even
though mixed unions have become more prevalent in Canada over the past several
decades, the marital alliances of Sikhs continue to be organized around principles of caste
endogamy, and clan exogamy (Partridge, 2005: 234). While a racialized hierarchy of
dating preferences obviously exists among members of the native-born population,
interethnic and interracial marriages with ‘outsiders’ are strongly discouraged in Sikh
families, and prohibited by priests in highly orthodox gurdwaras (Rait, 2005: 162).
Since members of ethnic communities feel primordial affinities with their own
‘kind’, and considering that insecurity is biogenetically coded in humans, marriages with
perceived outsiders may generate feelings of apprehension, angst, and exposure
especially among religious leaders and older immigrants. Consequently, as in the old
country, family izzat (honour) must be taken into careful consideration when selecting
partners for dating and mating since certain boundaries are non-traversable even in the
diasporic setting. Traditionalism is especially prevalent in strict orthodox Sikh families
who geographically reside in Canada, but live their daily lives according to static ideas,
norms, and values of Punjab.
Within the diaspora, young Sikh women disproportionately bear the burden of
family izzat since they are required to police their plutonic and intimate relationships in
accordance with the community’s double standard of sexuality (Nayar, 2004: 101). In

46

some extreme Canadian cases, familial opposition to intermarriage has resulted in
instances of brutal retaliation against Sikh women in the form of honour killings.
Considering that these types of homicides are typically sanctioned or executed by the
patriarch, or another high-status male figure within the family, a certain level of
machismo is also present among Canadian diasporic Sikhs (Jakobsh, 2010; Warner,
2012; Kanwar, 2015). Though this contention goes beyond the scope of the present paper,
it is important to note that gender is a perceptible source of division within the imagined
Sikh community.
Sociologically, the Sikh community’s cultural and sexual chauvinism may be
explained by the profound cultural strains which are produced during the interrelated
processes of resettlement and acculturation. Like their co-ethnics in Punjab, diasporic
Sikhs choose to live in close proximity with their relatives and maintain close-knit,
multigenerational family units (Ballantyne, 2006: 162). Even in the most foreign and
unwelcoming land, these types of household arrangements can provide immigrants with
support, safety, and predictability. Berkman and D'Ambruoso (2006: 207) acknowledge
that traditional Sikh family life can provide social and economic anchorage, but they
argue that cultural incongruence in multigenerational households can also lead to conflict.
A wide body of scholarly literature substantiates that assimilation can generate conflict
and threaten intimate consanguine relationships between descendants of immigrants and
their families (Sachleben, 2014; Hawley, 2013; Orozco, Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard, 2012).
Social and economic resources, place of birth, and generation status determine the
way in which experiences of physical uprooting and cultural dislocation are managed by
diasporic Sikhs. Since first-generation Sikh immigrants are usually unwilling and unable
to integrate into the Canadian mainstream, the norms and values of the country of origin
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will often take precedence over that of the host society (Jhutti-Johal, 2011: 159).
However, cultural assimilation becomes more likely over multiple generations due to the
fact that the children, and grandchildren, of immigrants become exposed to schools, peer
groups, and other agents of socialization in the destination country (Jule, 2003: 61).
Hostilities may arise between members of the same household when younger generations
reject the identity and culture of ‘home’ in favour of more Westernized alternatives.
The existence of intergenerational conflict indicates that the Sikh community in
Canada is in a state of transition. Today, second and third-generation diasporic Sikhs are
critically challenging norms of traditionalism, and religious orthodoxy which their
parents expect them to blindly adhere to. Contestation is only one of the novel responses
that Canadian-born Sikhs have developed in response to the problem of cultural
“inbetweenity”. Prevalent among descendants of immigrants, inbetweenity refers to the
emotional strain that is produced when individuals are forced to confront and adapt to
oppositional cultural formations (Ratele and Duncan, 2003: 124). While a small minority
have completely embraced the symbolic and spiritual insignias of the Khalsa
brotherhood, others have actively distanced themselves from the faith to maximize their
possibility of assimilation, and acceptance into the Canadian mainstream.
Rejecting both outright assimilation and regressive resegregation, the vast
majority of Sikh youth have attempted to strike a delicate balance between the two
irreconcilable, and often contradictory worlds they find themselves trapped between
(Sachleben, 2014: 90). Part of the growing number of Canadians who have assumed
hyphenated identities, these Sikh-Canadians (alternatively Punjabi-Canadians or IndoCanadians) are collectively forging a new creolized culture which bears little
resemblance to that of Punjab, or the adoptive country. Today, most Sikh-Canadians do
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not keep their kesh (uncut hair), and many others live at total odds with the ‘pure’ way of
life that is outlined in the Adi Granth. Considering that Mona (clean-shaven) and
Sehajdari (Sikh Deism) identities have become more common in the diaspora, religious
prohibitions against pre-marital sex, tobacco usage, and alcohol consumption are not
strictly observed (Morjaria-Keval and Keval, 2015: 124).
Studies have found that problem drinking is widespread in many overseas Sikh
communities (Cochrane, 1990; Sian, 2013). Lindrage, Dhillon, and Shah discovered that
second-generation British-Sikhs mitigated the tension of cultural inbetweenity by
rejecting both Punjabi and English values, while simultaneously creating an identity
exclusively around alcoholism (Quoted in Jamal et al., 2015: 246). The changing subject
matter of Punjabi folk music provides anecdotal support for the emergence of a
distinctively Sikh drinking culture. Shifting societal norms, and large-scale changes in
aesthetic preferences, have facilitated the popularization of songs like “ghar di sharab”
(homemade liquor or moonshine), “Patiala peg” (triple shot), and “daru pee ke” (after
drinking alcohol). Like their British-born counterparts, many Canadian-Sikhs do not
observe religiously based restrictions against alcohol consumption. Recently, the
manufacturers of Johnnie Walker nationally recognized residents of ‘Singhdale’ for their
unparalleled fondness of Scotch whisky (Brampton Guardian, 2012).
Under his program of religious revivalism, Bhindranwale had attempted to
eradicate evils like alcoholism which became prevalent among the Sikhs of Punjab in the
wake of rural modernization. During puritanical sermons, the militant revolutionary
frequently emasculated Sikh males who did not wear turbans, and vilified non-orthodox
members of the community as equivalent to the Hindu enemy (Harley, 2009; Hume,
2013). At the zenith of his proselytizing crusade, Bhindranwale proffered a rhetorical
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final solution to deal with Sikhs of lax faith: “[i]f I had my way, you know what I would
do to all these Sardars who drink whisky-shisky every evening? I would douse them in
kerosene oil and set fire to the bloody lot” (Quoted in Fernandes, 2011: 91).
Despite the fact that a significant proportion of Sikh-Canadians engage in one or
more of the depravities prohibited by the Adi Granth, many continue to blindly support
Bhindranwale, and glorify religious violence committed in the name of the Khalsa Panth
(Kaminsky and Long, 2011: 632). These perceptible contradictions allude to the
importance of narrative history for identity formation. Within the diaspora, the identity of
many second and third-generation Sikh youth has been built upon a highly selective, and
deeply emotive, episodic history of oppression, genocide, and martyrdom. The collective
grief of the community has been enough to produce fictionalized ideas of ‘home’ among
Canadian-Sikhs who remain willfully ignorant of the events leading up to the attack on
the Harmandir Sahib Complex, and the politics of the Punjab problem.
Remember and Forgetting: Prerequisites for Instituting the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat
The desire for belonging, and the longing for home, has led to romanticized ideas
about Khalistan among members of the Canadian Sikh diaspora. Even though identity
formation and transformation are complex processes, identification with non-rational,
non-class-based markers may be attributable to the need for in-group solidarity which
arises as a consequence of perceived vulnerability in the receiving society (Hawley,
1993: 38). In the short-term, elevated levels of ethnic consciousness and solidarity may
be conducive to managing the pervasive problems of racism and discrimination many
immigrant communities encounter overseas. For minority group members attempting to
consolidate their positions within unfamiliar lands, chances for economic survival may be
maximized by remaining true to their own ‘kind’. In the long-term, however, retreat into

50

religio-cultural exclusivity is neither a practical, nor sensible decision given that racial,
ethnic, and religious communities do not constitute homogenous groups.
As with the Sikh population of Punjab, perceptible caste and class-based
cleavages exist between members of the Canadian Sikh diaspora. Perplexingly, as a
religious ideology, Sikhism is devoid of caste stratification (Jodhka, 2014: 585). Yet,
notions of caste purity and pollution continue to permeate all aspects of social, political
and religious life for members of the diaspora. The divisiveness of the imagined
community is perhaps most perceptible when examined in relation to the organization,
and political management of Canadian gurdwaras. In the diasporic setting, Sikh places of
worship are primarily controlled by the two largest and most dominant caste groups; the
Jats and Ramgarhias (Singh, 1984: 42).
For the devout, gurdwaras represent a critical site “…from which one seeks divine
knowledge, spiritual guidance, bliss and peace of mind and soul” (Sikh Cultural Society
of Great Britain, 1993: 19). Yet, within the institutionally complete communities of
‘Singhdale’ and Surrey, violent power struggles have routinely erupted inside these
places of worship (Nayar, 2004; The Toronto Star, 2010). Considering that gurdwara
management committees receive large amounts of cash in donations from members of
their congregation, there is speculation that intra-ethnic violence may have underlying
material and economic origins.
The Ontario Khalsa Darbar (OKD), one of the largest Sikh temples in Canada, has
made national headlines on several occasions for allegations of corruption, and
mismanagement of funds. In 2006, a small faction of the gurdwara’s committee members
took the financial directors of OKD to court for failing to account for nearly three million
dollars in membership fees (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2007). The matter, which
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remains unresolved a decade later, has not deterred members of the congregation from
donating their hard-earned wages to the controversial temple.
Based on registered charity information submitted to Revenue Canada during the
2015 tax period, OKD reported an annual revenue of $1,988,204, and $13,834,598 in
total assets (Canada Revenue Agency, 2015). Due to the strong presence of the Sikhcentric ethnic media in the GTA, members of the diaspora have at least minimal
knowledge of the scandals, and problematic tendencies developing in their places of
worship. Yet, most Sikhs tend to disregard instances of financial mismanagement as
isolated occurrences, and fail to acknowledge the pervasive programs of ethnic, and
religious entrepreneurship being pursued by elites within their community.
Like other segments of the Canadian population, many diasporic Sikhs have put
aside rational understandings of class, and embraced the irrational elements of their
ethno-religious identities. As a whole however, Canadians seem to be aware that social
inequality exists, and that it has widened over the past several decades (Raphael, 2011;
92). Still, the vast majority possess either conservative, or highly ambivalent attitudes
towards social change. Canadians rarely, if ever, actively organize in order to remedy
their class-based grievances. Trotsky famously suggested that “…the mere existence of
privations is not enough to cause an insurrection, if it were, the masses would always be
in revolt” (Quoted in Swingewood, 1975: 129).
In Canada, attention is drawn away from the social disorders of the politicaleconomic system by way of elaborate political distraction, and incessant mass media
manipulation. For nearly a decade, the outgoing administration managed widening
economic inequalities by removing class terminology from political discourse. Justifying
the politics of erasure pursued by the Conservative party, ex-Prime Minister Stephen
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Harper suggested: “[w]e don’t believe in the politics of division and so-called class
warfare” (Quoted in Freeman, 2015; emphasis added). Parallels can be drawn between
Harper’s tactics and that of the ruling Party in Orwell’s dystopic novel “Nineteen EightyFour”.
In the book, the official language of the totalitarian regime is designed to diminish
the capacity for critical thought. As opposed to incorporating new words in to Newspeak,
the Party actively sought to reduce the number of words its citizens could use. Enos
(2013: 198) explains that this task was undertaken by the Party so that it “…would make
it impossible for an individual even to have an idea in opposition to any government
position, insofar as thought is dependent on words”. Like Big Brother, transnational
capitalist elites have a stake in removing class terminology from political discourse. For
without the conception of class, there can be no collective working-class consciousness,
and consequently no opportunity for revolutionary social change.
Today, while the vast majority of Canadians belong to the working-class in
objective terms, most fail subjectively to recognize that their collective interests are
juxtaposed to capital. Ironically, even though a highly polarized society has emerged,
capitalism continues to be extolled as virtuous and egalitarian by some of the most
disenfranchised and underprivileged populations. This anomaly may be attributable to the
fact that Canadians are taught to explain, and even justify, the persistence of class-based
inequalities individualistically, as opposed to structurally. While structural explanations
shed light on inequality as a public issue, individualistic explanations presume that it is
nothing more than a personal trouble (Mills, 1959: 3).
Members of the lay public tend to apply individualistic explanations in order to
rationalize social stratification. These explanations tend to emphasize attributes that
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individuals possess or lack, to explain why some people are more predisposed to
conditions of material deprivation than others. Poverty is assumed to be a consequence of
factors like individual laziness, lack of motivation or perhaps even cultural beliefs. From
a sociological perspective, the individualistic explanation is deficient since it amounts to
nothing more than victim-blaming. In contrast, structural explanations of inequality take
into consideration the vast matrix of domination which persistently structures
opportunities for the few, at the cost to the many. This approach effectively diverts blame
from the individual to the political-economic system. The supreme manifestation of the
victim-blaming discourse is the ideology of meritocracy which has been manufactured by
transnational elites, and profusely disseminated by the political puppets of capital: the
‘democratically’ elected representatives of the nation-state.
Recently, news of the appointment of four Sikh cabinet ministers was widely
circulated by domestic, and international media outlets. Sikhs, who had been the targets
of state-sanctioned genocidal pogroms in India, had been actively incorporated into the
Canadian political establishment. Symbolically, the new cabinet configuration provided a
sense of legitimacy to members of the imagined community that were geographically
dispersed across different parts of the globe. The collective sentiment of diasporic Sikhs
was captured by a headline published in the Toronto Star: “we have arrived” (Woods,
2015: emphasis added). Despite evidence of class, caste, and gender divisions within the
diaspora, many Sikhs still understood the cabinet appointments as community
achievements, as opposed to individual accomplishments. Since their countrymen had
been given a voice in the direction of their adoptive country, diasporic Sikhs felt that their
interests would also be represented.

54

Considering that governments do not really govern in capitalist societies, this
political arrangement can be understood as an elaborate attempt to appease ethnic voters,
and maintain social stability (Allahar and Côté, 1998: 8). Sensationalized press coverage
of upwardly-mobile Sikh immigrants not only perpetuates the illusory model minority
stereotype, but it also selectively glosses over the fact that most members of the imagined
community are far from affluent (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 186). Though national data
are not specifically collected on the employment trends of Sikhs, general extrapolations
can be made from the labour force profiles of Canadians with East Indian origins.
According to Statistics Canada (2007: 7), East Indians are more than twice as
likely to be employed in the declining manufacturing sector than any other group.
Moreover, in comparison to other racial and ethnic groups, East Indians are more
susceptible to conditions of unemployment and material deprivation. These trends are
surprising considering that, when compared to other Canadian adults, a relatively larger
proportion of East Indians hold a post- secondary college or university degree (Statistics
Canada, 2007: 7).
The anomalous labour market profiles of East Indians not only dispel meritocracy
as illusory, they also draw support for the vertical mosaic hypothesis. Like all other
capitalist societies, Canada remains stratified on the basis of race, ethnicity, and social
class (Porter, 2015; 73). In spite of the fact that wage stagnation and employment
precarity have become common place for Sikhs, and many other working-class
Canadians, the government recently issued a pay hike to cabinet ministers which brought
their annual salaries up to $170,400 (Parliament of Canada, 2016). The celebration of
symbolic victories, and elevated ethnic consciousness of diasporic Sikhs, must be
contextualized in light of these contradictions. Today, primordial affinities continue to
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distract many Punjabi-Sikhs from realizing the class interests which they share in
common with most other Canadians.
Members of the native-born population may have material interests in common
with immigrant populations, but many still perceive the changing face of Canada to be a
real threat to the status-quo. Immigration Watch, a White nationalist group that has
previously been investigated for the distribution of racist flyers in ‘Singhdale’, recently
demanded an apology from the Canadian government for its continued support of “Sikh
invasion” and white genocide (Brampton Guardian, 2015). Historically, racialized
immigrant communities have been blamed for the economic, social, and political
contradictions produced by neoliberal policies, and the endemic crises of global
capitalism.
Anti-immigrant sentiments become especially pronounced during periods of bust
when competition increases over scarce resources and jobs. Bonacich (1972: 547)
corroborates that ethnic antagonism often arises from split labour markets which are
typified by a three-way competition between capital, and two opposing ethnic or racial
groups which are in competition for the same jobs, but differ fundamentally on the price
they expect to be paid for their labour. Considering that the goal of all businesses is to
accumulate maximal profit at minimal cost, cheaper labour will always displace higher
priced labour when these types of conflicts occur.
In comparison to the embourgeoised proletariat of the affluent society,
immigrants represent a highly exploitable, cheap, and docile labour force since conditions
of uncertainty in the destination country place many under the compulsion of the whip of
hunger (Allahar and Hick, 2011: 3). The vulnerable status of immigrants, which forces
them to accept jobs at lower wages, also generates resentment among members of the
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higher price, native-born labour group. When a price differential becomes present, white
workers may espouse racist ideologies, or even resort to violence to protect their material
interests. In this context, racism is instrumental and may be interpreted as a rational shortterm decision on the part of a native-born white worker. By minimizing competition,
racism allows the higher price labour group to retain their jobs and secure a wage from
the capitalist class. However, in the long-term, this tactic endangers the entire workingclass movement.
White workers perpetuate hate as response to perceived job ‘theft’ and wage
undercutting, but they fail to realize that immigrants are used to “…regulate class conflict
directly by undercutting the collective actions launched by domestic worker
organizations, and indirectly by diverting the class hostilities rooted in the economy onto
alien scapegoats” (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 82). Thus, as opposed to the hyperexploited racial and ethnic ‘others’ who make up the industrial reserve army of labour,
the white workers’ real enemy is the bourgeoisie. Consequently, whenever workers from
the core countries use prejudice and racially motivated violence against their comrades
who originate from the periphery, they are behaving in a falsely conscious manner, even
if they are successful in supplanting them to protect their jobs. Today, trivial ethno-racial
divisions fragment the labour movement by preventing the masses from developing a
genuine class consciousness, and achieving their true revolutionary potential.
While native-born workers, visible minorities, women, gays, and other
historically marginalized populations hierarchize the importance of various oppressions,
and pursue efforts to retribalize and resegregate, the material conditions of capitalism –
which allow the few to rule and keep the vast majority subordinate – remain unscathed.
Considering that the struggle for human emancipation is intrinsically tied up with a
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growing need for solidarity, identity politics is unconducive to progressive social change.
Yet, under the larger project of revolutionary class struggle, racial, gender, and sexual
antagonisms can be redressed, and eventually eradicated. In order to abolish private
property, and achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat, oppressed groups must be
prepared to engage in the politics of remembering and forgetting. Now more than ever,
the similarities people share as global citizens must be selectively recalled, whereas
trivial differences must be consigned to oblivion.
Nonetheless, the political acts of remembering and forgetting are intrinsically tied
up with power and privilege (Allahar, 2011: 73). As aptly conveyed by Allahar (2011:
75), “…history is a bundle of silences…those who have power to construct the past
normally have power to order the present”. For ethno-religious groups like the Sikhs,
overlooking the role of the state in ethnic cleansing and extra-judicial punishment is a
painful experience. While these historical realities should not be forgotten, myths of
common descent, heroic ancestries and chosen people, problematize any possibility of
revolutionary class consciousness. Even though primordial identities are capable of
evoking feelings of belonging sometimes as intense as consanguineal bonds, they can
also ideologically distract people from the structural causes of subjugation.
SECTION V: CONCLUSION
This paper presented a conceptual sociological analysis of the diasporic politics of
identity and homeland. While acknowledging the limitations associated with economic
determinism, this paper demonstrated that ethno-racial markers of identity, and
primordial religious mythologies, can be politically employed to distract members of
oppressed groups from realizing the material conditions which perpetuate inequality in
post-colonial societies. From the very outset, the imagined Sikh community’s
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independence struggle has been rooted in stark class, and caste-based, power differentials
which have been generated by the political-economic contradictions of peripheral
capitalist development.
Since the culmination of the insurgency period, the state of Punjab became
plagued by conditions of abject poverty which forced farmers to commit suicide in the
thousands (Bourne, 2015: 56). Despite the fact that the misery of the agrarian peasantry is
intrinsically related to the intensification of globalization, and capitalist modernization,
revolution seems unlikely. Romanticized visions of Khalistan have also become
emotively embedded in the hearts and minds of many second and third-generation
diasporic youth beyond the land five rivers. Perplexingly, while newer generations of
Canadian-Sikhs support the imagined theocratic state of Khalistan, they selectively
disregard the righteous way of life envisioned by the founders of the Khalsa Panth, and
dismiss the spiritual guidance proffered in the Adi Granth. In both the core, and periphery
countries, human emancipation necessitates a collective sense of forgetfulness and
solidarity which remain at odds with the modern politics of identity.
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